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FOREWORD 
I have great pleasure in writing this foreword for the first discussion 
paper presented by the Department of Justice Studies of Edith Cowan 
University by Emeritus Professor laksiri Jayasuriya. Professor laksiri 
Jayasuriya has wide experience in dealing with ethnic and multicultural 
issues in Australia and has been involved in research and writing since 
the early seventies. 
It is important that issues such as racism and the law be discussed 
extensively In the wider community and this paper provides the Impetus 
for such discussion. The spirit of multiculturalism is greatly enhanced 
by the detailed analysis contained in this paper. Further, the timely 
release of this discussion paper which coincides with recent 
developments in Racism laws in Australia merits wide consideration 
both among practitioners in the field as well as the general community. 
Edith Cowan University is committed to the encouragement of academic 
and practical discussion on a variety of issues which affects the lives of 
people in Australia. 
I introduce and welcome this paper, the first to be published in the 
series. 
Professor Rod Underwood 
Dean 
Faculty of Health and Human Sciences 
Message from the Ethnic Communities Council of W A 
The Ethnic Community Council of Western Australia congratulates the Department 
of Justice Studies at Edith Cowan University and its Chairperson Mr Nara 
Srinivasan, on their decision to publish this occasional paper on Law and Racism. 
It is indeed a very timely and important initiative given the imminent introduction of 
the Commonwealth's proposed Racial Vilification legislation in the Senate. 
The public debate to date has unfortunately been skewed largely as a result of the 
Freedom of Speech lobby and other vested political interests. It. is essential that this 
emotionally charged issue is debated on the basis of factual information. 
Emeritus Professor Jayasuriya has done an excellent job in pulling together national 
and international experiences as well as providing an excellent framework and 
information base for debating these matters initially. 
This together with his numerous other achievements makes us proud to acknowledge 
the significant efforts of this notable ethnic Australian, to make our culturally 
diverse nation a more just and harmonious society. 
It is also pleasing to note that a leading academic institution has recognised the 
significance of addressing issues which are of importance to ethnic communities 
within the framework of a mainstream department ie. Department of Justice Studies. 
We wish Edith Cowan University every success in promoting this publication. 
Russell Raymond·OAM 
President, 
Ethnic Communities Council of Western Australia 
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1. Introduction - an Overview of 'Race' and Racism. 
Racism in Australian society is not something new and surprising. For a 
variety of historical and socio-political reasons it has existed from the earliest days 
·of colonisation, and there have been a variety of strategies tried over the years to 
deal with racism as a social problem. One strategy most frequently resorted to, 
especially in recent years, has been to use the law as a means of combating racism. 
Before considering the questions of law and racism, we need first to clarify what we 
mean by the term racism. 
Definitions of racism abound, some are helpful, and others less so. 'Race' 
and Racism are in short highly contested issues. What the term 'race' does is to 
provide a unit of classifi'cation for categorising the world's population in terms of 
inheritable characteristics (e.g., physical features, descent, blood type etc.) and 
these in tum are presumed to determine human abilities and other aspects of group 
culture. These accord with the popular view that human beings are separable into 
racial types which are permanent and enduring, and that human abilities are 
determined by 'race'. 
The concept of 'race' itself has undergone many changes in scientific 
theorizing and the current state of informed opinion is best expressed in a UNESCO 
statement (quoted in Jayasuriya 1991).2 This statement is quite critical of attaching 
too great a biological meaning to the concept mainly because the difference in 
genetic structures within a population group are as greater or even greater than 
those between two population groups. Therefore, whatever the differences 
observed, the science of human biology affords little justification for establishing a 
hierarchy between individuals or population groups, since no group possesses a 
consistent genetic inheritance. 
What this UNESCO statement does is to assert the basic biological unity of 
humanity. So what we end up with is the view that 'race' like ethnicity is a 'social 
construction' which subsumes a set of beliefs and resulting social practices such as 
negative attitudes, prejudice, discrimination and criteria for inclusion/exclusion in a 
given society. Consequently, what we have are racial ideologies; in short, as 
Miles3 puts it, in the popular consciousness this construction is basically a process 
by which the 'Other' is constructed. According to Miles (1982),4 racism is the 
'process of "racial" categorisation, whereby distinct cultural or ethnic groups are 
racially categorised by being presented as phenotypically different'. Thus, from the 
earliest days in Australia, according to Humphrey McQueen, the notion of 'race' 
carne to mean any cultural or linguistic group which was popularly labelled in this 
manner. As a result, we had an Irish 'race', a German 'race', and even an 'Anglo-
Celtic race' (!)depending on the location and politics of the speaker. 
Whatever it is, or however we use the term, the distinctive feature of racism 
as an ideology lies in the notion of racial inequalities: the view that some races are 
superior/inferior in terms of a hierarchic ordering. To be more precise, what the 
doctrine of racism does is to characterise groups that are essentially the result of 
social and historical processes as biological or pseudo biological groupings. 
Furthermore, racism as an ideology ascribes negatively evaluated characteristics in a 
deterministic manner to these biological groups that abilities and other cultural 
features are determined by 'race'. These perceptions as inaccurate and derogatory 
stereotypes have an effect on our behaviour and the way in which we view the 
world; and the net result of this is that we engage in advocating or espousing racist 
belief and indulge in racist behaviour such as: incitement to hostility and hatred on 
account of one's 'race'. In other words it leads to a racialism which advocates the 
dogma that some 'races' will always be inferior/superior for biological or pseudo 
biological reasons. 
Sometimes the term 'vulgar racism' is used to characterise these extreme 
forms of racism, involving the dissemination of violent propaganda with a view to 
inciting racial hatred and violence (Radis).5 It is these 'public acts' of racism, such 
as racial harassment, vilification and violence, that have been matters of public 
concern in several countries as warranting social interventions at various levels e.g., 
preventative strategies, protection of victims and imposition of sanctions against 
perpetrators of violence and discrimination. 
It may be asked why racism in whatever form it is manifest, e.g. as racial 
vilification or 'hate speech' and in incitement to racial hatred is considered to be an 
issue of social and legal concern. An obvious and direct answer is that in a free and 
democratic society which guarantees basic individual rights and freedoms one needs 
to invoke the protection of the law to safeguard the inherent dignity of the human 
person as well to maintain public order. In this regard, one could argue against the 
need for special legislation or 'dedicated legislation' covering racial hatred or group 
hostility by subsuming these kinds of conduct under existing laws such as the law of 
defamation or law of sedition, blasJ)hemy, assault, spreading falsehood etc. 
However, as Melinda Jones (1993)6 explains, these strategies which endeavour to 
use existing laws or to bolster existing laws, are fraught with difficulty. For 
instance, in the case of invoking a charge of seditious libel for making racial 
vilification a punishable criminal offence, one needs to be able to show that the 
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offensive language or utterance was 'calculated to promote public disorder'. 
Another possibility is to extend the law relating to defamation to cover groups; but 
this becomes problematic because it involves invoking some notion of 'group rights' 
to cover defamation of an individual as a member of a group. 
While these legal strategies, whether through the criminal or civil law, are 
still available, significant developments in international law - such as the enactment 
of international conventions relating to human rights and the wide community 
acceptance of the values and principles of a multicultural society, such as equality 
of respect, tolerance and understanding, have led to the introduction of 'dedicated 
legislation' dealing with racial discrimination harassment and violence as a special 
category of law. As the recent Human rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(HREOC) Report on Racist Violence (1993) points out, existing common law 
remedies 'do not provide a definite enough remedy for the harm caused by words 
and actions of a racist nature' (p. 278). Hence the need for 'dedicated legislation'. 
This paper examines the way in which Australian society has responded with 
legislative safeguards to deal with the harmful manifestations of racism such as 
disharmony, hatred, conflict discrimination and in its extreme, forms of racial 
violence. In the first part, the paper considers Federal and State based legislation up 
to 1990; the second part reviews briefly some more recent initiatives, and 
concludes with an overview of the role of the law in dealing with racism. 
2. Federal Legislation relating to Racism. 
The Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 
The history of the Australian experience in dealing with racism as a social 
issue and a matter of public concern goes back a long way but its recent history 
dates mainly from the time of the introduction of the Racial Discrimination Act in 
1975 (RD Act). This was a sequel to the fact that Australia was a signatory to the 
International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
in 1975 (CERD). In fulfilment of our treaty obligations we placed on the statute 
book the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 - a landmark piece of Australian 
legislation. This Act which was destined to have a seminal influence on Australia's 
social and political life was also binding on all governments. 
Thus, state Governments were expected to bring their laws and practices into 
conformity with this Act as part of Australia's commitment to meeting its 
international treaty obligations. In fact, in satisfying this Convention an obligation 
was cast upon the Commonwealth Government to ensure that the provisions of this 
Act were implemented throughout the country and this task was entrusted to the 
Human Rights Commission (HRC) (19481-1986). Currently, following an 
amendment to the RD act in 1980, these are performed by the restructured Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) which replaced the HRC in 
1986. 
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Ever since the passage of the R D Act (1975) there has been in informed 
circles 7 considerable degree of concern about the reluctance of Federal and State 
governments to act on the specific issues of incitement to racial hatred and 
defamation of racial groups. Much of the difficulty, as we know it today, has 
arisen because the RD Act, as passed in 1975, was subject to several amendments in 
order to gain its successful passage through Parliament. The strong opposition 
expressed by the Liberal/National Parties to two Clauses of the Draft Racial 
Discrimination Bill in 1973, viz Clause 28 & 29 (one dealing with incitement and 
the other with dissemination) was a key element in the 1975 debate surrounding the 
racial discrimination legislation. Eventually, this opposition led to the Australian 
Government entering a reservation on Article 4 (a) of CERD. 
This Article, i.e. Article 4(a), states that the dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority, hatred or incitement to racial hatred, as well as all acts of racial 
violence or incitement to racial hatred are offences punishable by law. In other 
words, these provisions pertain to offences relating to racial vilification (hate 
speech) and incitement to racial hatred. Australia opted to delete the provisions of 
this Article from the provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act, preferring instead 
to deal with these acts (e.g. unlawful dissemination of 'race' -hate material) simply 
as civil wrongs, which are subject to conciliation. At the same time, Australia 
agreed that it would consider enacting suitable legislation at 'the first suitable 
moment'. (This moment may have arrived after nearly two decades!) 
In an early review of the operation of RD Act of 197S, Trlins observed 'that 
the most serious defect of the Act is the absence of provisions to deal with the 
publication and dissemination of racist material and ideas. Nor does the Act include 
the provisions prohibiting discrimination by private voluntary associations on the 
use of derogatory terms'. The opposition to Article 4(a) of the Iilternational 
Convention was largely on grounds of the need to uphold the priority of the right to 
free speech as against other competing claims; any restriction on this right, and 
right to freedom of expression, has been a recurring theme in the continuing 
opposition to this particular provision. 9 
Whilst other countries have established laws to deal with the dissemination, 
or the purveying, of race hatred in official circles, Australia has tended until very 
recently to reject any such move on the civil libertarian grounds of not wanting to 
interfere with the sacrosanct right to freedom of speech and expression. In this 
debate the right of individuals (the .victims of racism) and groups to freedom from 
discrimination and racist abuse are often overlooked. But, even if we were to agree 
that such a law was needed, there remain some complex issues of principle that 
need to be examined before embarking on a practical model of legal intervention. 
In 1983 the HRC cogently argued10 that, while it stood firmly committed to 
the fundamental right of freedom of expression, it challenged the conventional view 
that this right should prevail over other rights such as the rights of racial groups 
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whose very existence may be threatened or denied by giving free rein to those who 
had racist intentions. In defending its proposals the HRC felt that, the question it 
had to decide was' whether to support the right of free speech, if it is used to 
advocate the destruction of the rights of another racial group; and equally whether 
free rein should continue to be allowed to those who argue for the destruction of a 
society where everyone has the same human rights. 
Accordingly, the HRC maintained that there were no grounds for continuing 
Australia's reservation on Article 4(a) and recommended that action be takento 
amend the legislation, making racial incitement a statutory offence. Furthermore, 
the HRC observed that: 
important reasons for incorporating these amendments into the Racial Discrimination Act 
are the declaratory and educational effects they would have. The amendments should 
establish that community opinion now holds such statements to be unacceptable and 
unlawful. Whatever else their impact, they should serve to restrain the statements of 
persons in public employment. One quarter of all complaints of racial defamation made to 
the Commissioner of Community Relations have been made against such persons as police, 
welfare officers and local council employees. The education would come through public 
discussion and through the conciliation process itself (-). 
Australia's stand on Article 4(a) remained inflexible for many years and was further 
strengthened in 1980 when Australia entered a similar reservation on Article 20 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Here again, the 
reasons given by Australia for this reservation were that it was opposed to any 
legislation prohibiting the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 20 of 
ICCPR states: 
1. any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law; and that 
2. any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law 
Clearly as Paul Stein QC pointed out as far back as 1982: 
these reservations have led to significant gaps in our armoury and ability to attach and 
present racism and racial conflict ... We possess neither shield nor sword to prevent the 
worst excesses of unbridled race hatred. II 
As previously indicated, one of the first pieces of legislation proposed to remedy 
this state of affairs was the amendments to the RD Act recommended by the HRC in 
1983 to make racial hatred and racial defamation as identifiable offences. These 
along with the legislative approach recommended are given below: 
The Proposed Amendmenfs12 
53. It is suggested that new provisions should be included in the law to outlaw 
certain kinds of racist statements, and that these should take the form of two 
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additional provisions and one defmition to be incorporated into the Racial 
Discrimination Act: 
(1) Incitement to racial hatred. A provision to make it unlawful for a person 
publicly to utter or publish words or engage in conduct which, having regard 
to all the circumstances, is likely to result in hatred, contempt or violence 
against a person or persons, or a group of persons, distinguished by 'race', 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin: this provision should be drafted 
so as to ensure that certain valid activities are not brought within its scope, 
e.g., the publication or performance of bona fide works of art; genuine 
academic discussion, news reporting of demonstrations against particular 
countries; or the serious and non-inflammatory discussion of issues of 
public policy. 
(2) Racial defamation. A provision to make it unlawful publicly to threaten, 
insult or abuse an individual or group, or hold that individual or group up to 
contempt or slander, by reason of 'race', colour, descent or national or 
ethnic origin. 
(3) Defamation of publication. A defmition clause to make it clear that 
publication is to be taken in a very broad way to cover the print and 
electronic media, sign boards, abusive telephone calls etc. and that both the 
individual making the statement and, where publication implies 
endorsement, the publisher would be covered by the two provisions above. 
Approach 
54. The Commission has considered more than twenty other legislative options, 
but prefers those specified above for the reasons set out below: 
Reasons for Amending the Racial Discrimination Act 
(a) An amendment to the Racial Discrimination Act is a relatively simple 
matter, clearly within the jurisdiction for the Commonwealth, and justified 
by the Racial Discrimination Convention (particularly Article 4) 
(b) Setting the provisions within the ambit of the Racial Discrimination Act 
makes it possible to retain the very considerable advantage of adopting 
conciliation procedures and educational activities in such cases. 
(c) Avoiding a criminal law approach maintains the parallel with the defamation 
of individuals and increases the educative role of the law. 
(d) The advantages of instituting a form of action for group defamation are in 
large part achieved without having to go into the very complex issues related 
to groups defamation in general. 
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(e) New Zealand experience with both a criminal law provision and a race 
relations conciliation provision suggests that the latter approach is both more 
used and more effective. 
(f) After two years of consideration of possible amendments to New south 
Wales legislation, the New South Wales Race Relations consultative 
Committee decided to recommend an amendment to the federal Racial 
Discrimination· Act. 
These amendments, as enumerated above, proposed a general prohibition on 
'public acts' considered likely to incite racial hatred and/or be considered 
defamatory of racist groups or individuals associated with these groups as well as an 
exclusion of certain activities from these restrictions. Although these carefully 
thought out and eminently reasonable proposals were not acted upon by the 
Commonwealth, they have continued to be a major influence on thinking around 
this issue for nearly a decade. 
3. State Based Dedicated Legislation: NSW and WA (1989-1990) 
Somewhat surprisingly, considering that it was the conservative political 
parties that opposed the inclusion of a statutory prohibition on racial vilification and 
incitement to racial hatred in 1975 at the Federal level, the Liberal/National 
government of Nick Greiner in NSW became the first State government in Australia 
to address these issues publicly. 13 Admittedly, the Greiner government benefited 
from the groundwork laid by the previous Wran and Unsworth governments in 
NSW which had introduced a Draft Bill to make racial vilification unlawful. 14 
It is noteworthy and particularly significant that the NSW legislation was 
enacted as a bipartisan measure. This in itself was of considerable symbolic 
significance in indicating the strong community stand against hate-propaganda. The 
NSW Anti Discrimination Racial Vilification Amendment Act, passed in 1989 
presents an interesting viewpoint on thorny issues of legal principle and social 
practice that are inherent in dealing with this complex social issue.ts The following 
highlight some of the key features of this pioneering Australian legislation: 
• Contrary to much of the overseas precedents the NSW legislation 
avoids a criminal law approach and is less punitive. This enables, 
among other things, ·in particular, the acceptance of less stringent 
standards of proof. 
• By placing the Act within the scope of the NSW Anti Discrimination 
Act, the NSW legislation also adopts, as with the HRC amendments 
of 1983, a conciliation approach. This Act opens up complaints to all 
and involves an informal (administrative) investigative and 
consultative process. 
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• However, there is provision for more serious matters, such as those 
involving threat or incitement of physical harm, to be referred to the 
Attorney-General for possible prosecution as a criminal offence. 
Furthermore, cases not dealt with to the satisfaction of the 
complainant ,or those that should be differently handled as a matter 
of public interest, are referred to a quasi-judicial body, the EO 
Tribunal. 
• The extent of behaviour covered by the Act is limited to 'public acts' 
in public places which are likely to incite racial hatred or contempt 
for another on the grounds of 'race' (excluding matters such as those 
of public order which are automatically dealt with by the existing 
criminal code). Importantly, this does not include racist display 
offences and possession of such material. 
• The question of inteht or mens rea is not included in the legislation 
on the grounds that proof of intention was unduly complicated. 
Instead, as with similar UK legislation all that is required is proof of 
the likelihood of racial hatred. The simple question posed was 'why 
should a person not be responsible for the natural and reasonably 
expected consequences of his or her behaviour?' 16 In the UK and 
elsewhere, it is correctly assumed, that a person may reasonably be 
expected to be held responsible for the consequences of that person's 
conduct in matters of this nature. It has been argued the inclusion of 
intent would seriously incapacitate the legislation and make it 
unenforceable. 
Following practices elsewhere to ensure that other rights such as freedom of 
expression were not interfered with, the NSW legislation allowed for several 
defences of reasonable excuse such as a fair report or comment on matters of 
'public interest', or for purposes of 'discussion and debate'. These exclusions 
permit a balancing of the rights of freedom of expression and the freedom of the 
press, in such matters as academic reports, public discussions, media comment, etc. 
The increasing incidence of racism in Western Australia, as a result of the 
racist activities of the Australian Nationalist Movement (ANM) in Perth, led to the 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia being requested by the Western 
Australian Government to investigate possible changes to the Law to deter acts 
which incite racial hatred. In 1989 the WA government, following the release of 
the Law Reform Commission Report, 17 introduced legislation to deal with racial 
vilification and harassment. Its provisions were influenced by previous legislation in 
Australia and elsewhere. 
The WA legislation of 1990 (Crime Code Amendment - Racial Harassment 
and Incitement to Racial Hatred) is based on amendments to the W A Criminal 
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Code. This act makes it a criminal offence to possess and/or publish material to 
harass a racial group or to make racial hatred. However, these offences are of a 
limited value because they are material restricted only to 'written or pictorial 
nature'. The provisions in the WA Bill are also more stringent than the NSW and 
current UK legislation because the determination of an offence requires proof of 
intent or mens rea (cf the 1976 UK legislation). The need to include intent in the 
WA legislation clearly exaggerates the danger of the possible misuse of this type of 
offence. The intent requirement makes this legislation hopelessly ineffective and 
defeats its very purposes. 
The WA legislation warrants comparison, in particular, with the pioneering 
NSW legislation as there are some important points of difference. The W A 
legislation is, unlike the NSW Legislation, based on amendments to the criminal 
code and is framed in the mould of the criminal law ie., racial incitement is 
regarded as a criminal offence; but these are restricted to the possession, publication 
and display of racially threatening or abusive material. Additionally, it requires the 
proof of intention; this contrasts sharply with the NSW and also UK legislation 
which only requires evidence of the likelihood that these acts would lead to racial 
hatred or promote racial hatred. 
In many respects, the W A Bill appears to be loosely modelled upon similar 
UK legislation with the most relevant sections being drawn from the Public Order 
Act (UK) 1986 It is also clear that the General Public Order offences in S5 and S4 
of the UK18 have inspired the second tier offences in the WA Bill (i.e., S78 and S80 
dealing with harassment of the constituent group). The 1986 UK legislation itself is 
an outcome of amendments to previous UK legislation, and these highlight the 
changes in the UK legislation that have taken place over the past two decades. 
In Britain S6 of the Race Relations Act (UK) 1965 included an intent 
requirement in respect of the publishing and distribution of racially offensive 
material. This intent requirement was cited as a major obstacle to obtaining an 
effective prosecution under the Act, and in 1976 an amendment was passed by the 
Labor Government in Britain to remove this requirement. Hereafter racial 
incitement was made an offence punishable under the Public Order Act (POA) and 
changes effected to POA 1936. Section SA of POA superseded S6 of the Race 
Relations Act 1965, and at the same time removed the element of intent from the 
offence of incitement to racial hatred. Hereafter it was sufficient - for purposes of 
establishing that an offence has been committed- to show that 'having regard to all 
the circumstances hatred [was] likely to be stirred up'. 
The removal of 'mens rea' from the law in the UK (in 1976) - heavily 
influenced by the Scarman Report - was controversial but it was argued in its 
defence that 'the deterrent effect of the law justified its departure from normal 
principles of law making' . It should be noted however, that a list of defences was 
included in S5A to ameliorate the potential breadth of this Section, not the least of 
which entitled the defendant to raise any defence open to him/her in the event of a 
prosecution thereunder. 
9 
The Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher reinstated the intent 
requirement, in S18 of the Public Order Act (1986) and at the same time stated that, 
where intent cannot be proved, the likelihood of racial hatred being stirred-up 
constitutes sufficient grounds upon which to bring a prosecution. However, the 
ostensibly wide scope of SIS must be examined in the light of the defences provided 
in Sl8(5). Where no intent can be made out, it is a complete defence for the 
Accused to claim ignorance of the threatening abusive or insulting nature of the 
material. The onus is then on the prosecution to show that the Accused did in fact 
have such knowledge. Thus the burden of this onus is comparable with having to 
prove intent in the first instance. 
4. Recent Federal and State Developments (1991-1993) 
State I)evelopments 
Unlike NSW and W A two other States and Territories (ACT and Qld) have 
decided against introducing special legislation to deal with racial vilification. They 
have regarded racial vilification and racial harassment as coming within the 
jurisdiction of the existing anti-discrimination legislation. In the ACT this refers to 
s65-67 of the ACT Discrin:tination Act of 1991, and in Qld to S126 of the Anti 
Discrimination Act of 1992. These Acts - as is characteristic of anti-discrimination 
legislation - provide statutory prohibitions on racial discrimination.t9 As a rule, this 
legislation provides civil remedies for.discrimination on the grounds of 'race', 
ethnic or national origin, in relation tO' public matters of employment, housing, 
education and provisions of goods and services. 
In 1990, the Victorian State government appointed a Committee to report on 
issues of racial vilification, and this Committee reported in March 1992. The 
Committee, in its report, described racial vilification as a 'statement which 
expresses or promotes hatred, contempt or ridicule of a person or group of people 
on the basis of the person's of the group's race' ; and recommended the 
introduction of special legislation to deal with racial vilification. Adopting the 
procedures of the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act of 1984, this Report too, defined 
'race' broadly by reference to colour, nationality, and ethnic or national origin. 
But, more importantly, the Report is unique in the Australian context because it 
makes specific reference to religion alongside 'race' . 
In general, Australian reports and relevant anti-racist legislation (e.g., 
Federal Racial Discrimination Act, Racial Vilification legislation of NSW and W A) 
have tended to subsume religious afftliation of victims under the generic category of 
ethnicity or ethnic origin. 'Race', includes religion, because 'race' is defined-
following CERED - as a broad and inclusive term. This is, by and large, 
consistent with practices overseas, in particular the UK. However, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see 319 [2]) identifies religion, specifically in 
referring to 'identifiable groups' against which the Charter forbids the wilful 
promotion of hatred. On this question of religion, it is worthwhile noting that 
recently the former Australian Attorney General (Mr M. Duffy) took a somewhat 
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different stand when he stated quite explicitly that the Racial Discrimination Act is 
not 'the appropriate place' for making 'inciting religious hatred and vilification of 
religious groups' unlawful acts. 20 But, without making specific reference to 
religion, Duffy went on to suggest that 'vilification on the ground of "race", colour, 
national or ethnic origin covers everybody', and therefore, that the provision of 
Racial Discrimination Act includes invariably, religious groups. 
Interestingly, the Racial and Religious Vilification Bill of 1992, proposed by 
the Victorian Labor government in June 1992, contrary to the Victorian 
Government Committee's recommendations, chose not to establish new criminal 
offences for racial vilification and incitement to racial hatred, including the 
possession and display of any threatening or abusive material intended to incite 
racial or religious hatred. As Grimm (1993) notes, the Victorian Government, 
Proposal established offences 'which may only be prosecuted by the State' at the 
instigation of any citizen, but are subject only to 'civil remedies'. 
The first two offences in the proposed Victorian Bill dealt with racial 
vilification or hate speech and racist incitement on the grounds of 'race' or religion. 
The second group of offences in the Victorian Bill relate 'to possession, display or 
distribution of threatening or vilifying material with the intention of thereby creating 
racial hatred or intimidating a social or religious groups' (p. 23). These offences-
as in similar W A legislation - refer to written or pictorial material excludes any 
reference to audio-video material, and require proof of intention or mens rea. In 
other words, the mere fact of possession or distribution does not create an offence. 
Unlike the WA legislation as the Victorian legislation as proposed specifically 
empowered local authorities - without making it obligatory - to remove offensive 
material from display. 
A noteworthy feature of the Victorian proposal was the provision made for 
certain forms of racial or religious harassment, e.g., conflict between neighbours, 
to be dealt with by civil courts. The purpose of this, as in many other aspects of 
the legislation, was to de-emphasise the punitive aspects of the legislation and stress 
that the legal remedies were really 'a second string to educational programs at all 
levels' (Grimm 1993, 24). · 
Federal Government Initiatives 
Influenced by the 'Great Immigration Debate' of 1983, and community 
concern expressed in the late 1980s by the spate of anti-Asian racist statements 
expressed in the media and more blatantly in the form of graffiti all governments 
have embarked on a range of strategies to counter the growth of racism and 
prejudice against aboriginal people, Jews, and Asian settlers.21 Additionally, there 
has been continuing international criticism relating to Australia's failure to respect 
its international obligations. These largely relate to the reservations entered with 
respect of Article 4 (a) of the CERD and Article 20 ofiCCPR and there have been. 
important shifts of thinking in the 1990s with regard to both these reservations. 
11 
In the matter of the IntenuJtional Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Australia has made a declaration under 
Article 14 of the Convention which permits Australian citizens to lodge complaints 
with the CERD. As regards the ICCPR Reservation, the most important dev-
elopment has been Australia's accession to the First Option Protocol to the ICCPR 
(from 25th December 1991). As a result of Australia signing this Protocol, the 
Human Rights Committee, of ICCPR is now competent to receive and consider 
communications from individuals who claim that their rights under the Covenant are 
being violated. But before such a complaint is entertained by the Human Rights 
Committee of ICCPR, an individual must first exhaust available and effective 
domestic remedies. In fact, the first successful Australian case in terms of the First 
Option Protocol has been that of the Tasmanian Gay Activist who complained 
against Tasmanian State laws proscribing homosexual sexual activities. 
These new initiatives indicate the extent to which international law is 
influencing the development of Australian legal practices in combating racism and 
discriminatory practices. The most recent evidence of this is the undertaking given 
by the former Attorney General, Michael Duffy in relation to the UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of All forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion 
or Belief. Duffy stated in Parliament that Australia fully supported this Declaration 
and assured Parliament that he will be declaring it to be an Instrument relating to 
human rights and freedoms, coming within the purview of the Human Rights and 
Equal Ooportunitv Act of 1986. According to Duffy, the effect of this move will be 
to bring complaints made on the grounds of being discriminated on the a basis of 
religious belief~ under the HREOC Act provisions and not under the RD Act of 
1975. 
Concurrently, the Australian government has, after vacillating for over 
decades, finally indicated that it will take action to amend the RD Act so as to 
remove the reservation on Article 4(a) and introduce statutory offences relating to 
racial vilification. These moves have no doubt been influenced by international and 
domestic pressures, in particular, the widespread community concern about the 
growing incidence of racism. The latter has been documented by the HREOC 
National Inquiry into Racial Violence (see HREOC Report 1991). The proposed 
Federal legislation is also to a large measure due to the existence of state legislation 
indicating clearly that the Commonwealth legislation is lagging behind in this 
regard. 
The HREOC Report of 1991 on Racist Violence, among its several 
recommendations for dealing with racist violence, argued strongr for changes to 
the RD Act of 1975. It is recommended that: 
1. the Racial Discrimination Act should be extended to cover racial 
harassment, and 
2. the Crimes Act be amended to create two new Federal Offences, viz. 
racial violence and intimidation; and incitement to racial vilification, 
and racial hatred. 
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These recommendations have been acted upon by the Australian Government 
with the introduction of Racial Discriminalion Legislation Amendment Bill of 1992 
which has lapsed.· The main object of these amendments was to repeal the 
reservation entered by Australia on Article 4(a) of the CERD in 1975. As noted 
earlier, Article 4(a) required that racial incitement to hostility and hatred as well as 
the dissemination of racial hostility through publication be regarded as a punishable 
statutory offence. 
Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody and the Australian Law Reform Commission Report on 
'Multiculturalism and the Law', the changes to the RD Act makes racial vilification 
unlawful but not a crime. The proposed amendment to the Racial Discrimination 
Act in the lapsed Bill of 1992, makes it unlawful for a person to do an act that is 
likely in all the circumstances, to stir up hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule 
against a person or a group of persons on the ground of 'race', colour or national or 
ethnic origin. The amendment also made it unlawful to incite the doing of unlawful 
acts. Complaints with regard to racial harassment, were to be processed by the 
HREOC and subject to procedures of conciliation.22 Only civil remedies were 
available if and when the conciliation processes fail. 
In addition, there were several exclusion clauses for acts done in good faith. 
This was, as in the NSW legislation, inserted to ensure that 'certain valid activities 
are not brought within its scope, e.g., the publication of bona fide works of art, 
genuine academic discussion of any matter of public interest, making or publishing 
a fair report of any event or matter of public interest. 23 
At the same time, the Australian Government sought to amend the Crimes 
Act of 1914 to make incitement to racial hatred a criminal offence. Racial 
Incitement, is understood to refer to the doing of a public act which is offensive to a 
group identified by 'race', colour, national or ethnic origin. These public acts may 
refer to words, or conduct, including threats of violence and require proof of 
intention to incite hatred or cause harm against the specified group. The offence of 
incitement to hatred incurs a maximum penalty of twelve months and threats of 
violence a maximum penalty of two years. The law, as Attorney-General Duffy 
explained in Parliament in 1992 was also 'intended to cover racist statement or 
propaganda of serious and damaging kind', such as the dissemination of printed 
matter, calling for the repatriation of certain ethnic groups or purporting to inflict 
violence on a particular group of people. 
These proposals are more like the W A Legislation which involves the 
criminalisation of these offences. 
5. Conclusion 
It is clear that the central and overriding issue relating to the use of legal 
remedies for dealing with racial harassment and racial vilification surrounds the 
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importance and significance attached to the democratic values enshrined in the right 
to freedom of expression. There is no doubt ultimately that it is a question of 
balancing of rights, ie., the need to give equal consideration to the rights of the 
individual for protection from racial harassment and the right to freedom of 
expression. 
Nowhere is the conflict more vividly and dramatically portrayed than in the 
USA and Canada, which unlike Australia and the UK, have enshrined a Bill of 
Rights which entrenches as in the USA First Amendment the right of Free Speech. 
The Canadian situation is more revealing because, unlike in the USA Constitution 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) (hereinafter referred to as 
the Charter), contains in Section 1, an express limitation clause on the rights of free 
speech and expression. 24 Accordingly, it is stated in Section I of the Charter that it 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The relevant freedoms set out in the Charter include a specific reference to 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media of communication 
As Montigny (1992) point out, Section I of the Charter 'places limits on the 
guaranteed rights without being required to give them an unnecessary restrictive 
scope' (p. 35). The Canadian courts, in interpreting this section have emphasised 
that no protection would be accorded to 'violent forms of expression such as threat 
of violence, destruction of property, or other "unlawful conduct"'. Admittedly, the 
exclusion of hate propaganda from the scope of the freedom of expression raises 
thorny issues of principle and legal definition. But at the same time, there is 
growing consensus in the USA and Canada of the need to interpret this fundamental 
right flexibly. As the Canadian Chief Justice Dickson (quoted by Montigny) put it 
tersely and wisely: ,! 
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are not, however, absolute, It may 
become necessary; to limit rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would 
be inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance. 
Thus, in the end, it is a question of principle, and definition which has have 
to be measured and judged against community values and standards in a free and 
democratic society. 
In considering the apparent conflict between the right to free speech and 
right of protection from racial harassment, it needs to be borne in mind that there 
has never been an absolute right to free speech or freedom of expression in both 
civil and criminal law. For example, there is no freedom for expression which 
jeopardises national security, sedition, or legal rules protecting trade secrets. 
Likewise there are laws concerning blasphemy, obscenity, and also libellous and 
defamatory statements against individuals. As one Canadian theorist expressed it, 
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adding one more restriction to this list would not necessarily interfere with the 
advocacy of justi~. To quote Paul Stein QC: 
Crucial as freedom of speech is, there is an equal basic need for society to avoid group 
hostility, violence and conflict. It is therefore a question of balancing a rather abstract view 
of freedom of expression against the serious loss to society arsing from racial tension caused 
by group defamation. 25 · 
The other issue on which there has been some difference among legal 
theorists is whether 'injunctive relief is preferable as against criminal procedures' 
(Alan Goldberg). 26 By and large, policy makers have been reluctant to adopt 
criminal procedure except in extreme of racist conduct, relying on the effectiveness 
of the law to be in acting as a deterrent rather than being seen as a punitive 
measure. 
Over and above the legal niceties surrounding the 'use' of legal procedures 
for dealing, we need to pose the more critical question as to whether legislation is 
the most appropriate way to proceed in dealing with a complex social issue such as 
racism. 27 Put simply, are legal remedies effective and entirely satisfactory in 
combating racism? Those who haye advocated some form of legislative 
intervention to deal with racism have clearly recognised that the law has only a 
limited role in this regard. 
One Canadian authority, Rosenthal,28 has stated that the criminal law is not 
the most effective weapon against expressions of racism but adds that 'it is however 
necessary to deal with the problems of hate literature and racial harassment' on the 
crudest forms which can and should be controlled by the criminal law. It may serve 
to deter most violent and extreme forms of racism, e.g., vulgar racism; but it can 
never eliminate other more subtle and often pernicious forms of racism in society, 
especially indirect discrimination and prejudice which are more widespread and 
insidious. 
We, therefore, need to be careful not to exaggerate the importance of the 
legal and other remedial measures such as human rights legislation and rest 
confident with such measures. The law does and can play a useful and constructive 
role, if it is seen primarily as providing the social foundations needed for altering 
deep-seated values, social attitudes and belief systems. Law is effective primarily 
as a moral examplar, a declaratory statement, embodying the value and norms and 
standards of acceptable behaviour in society. 
Effective legal remedies which range from the common law to different 
forms of dedicated legislation require that they be concurrently associated with other 
. forms of social intervention. Instead of adopting a 'fire-brigade' approach in 
dealing with racism, we need to pursue a multi-faceted strategy of legal and social 
action. In short, we need to consider the adequacy of current machinery and 
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procedures for handling community and 'race' relations nationally and also at the 
local level. 
Finally, it is relevant to make some brief comment on the need for non legal 
remedies to exist alongside legal strategies for an effective overall strategy for 
dealing with all forms of racism, pervasive institutional racism to acts of individual · 
racism. The non -legal strategies refer in particular to a community relations 
strategy. The main thrust of any community relations strategy should lie in 
bringing about changes in individuals and the wider society. These changes may 
take place at different levels and are fundamentally those which will make all 
persons act fairly, justly and equitably towards each other, particularly members of 
ethnic minority groups. The desire for change may stem from different causes, 
external or internal, but we need to focus on the change process. In this respect, 
what is particularly important is to define the goals of this change process in 
concrete fashion. These goals will define what needs to happen to specific aspects 
of an organisation, institution or group structure if it is to achieve the desired 
changes. 
We may, for the convenience of analysis and development of strategies of 
change, identify three levels. The first of these is at the level of the individual and 
relates to personal discriminations against particular members, usually members of a 
racial or ethnic minority group the legal remedies currently available are applicable 
at this level and regards racism as a manifestation of deviant, pathological 
individual behaviour. The next level relates to 'structural racism' whereby the rules 
and practices of an organisation directly or indirectly discriminate against persons 
from particular groups; and the third level is what may be called 'cultural racism', 
where the racism and discrimination stems from the culture or climate of the group 
or organisation rather than the individual or organisational structure. 
We require a variety of community relation strategies to deal effectively with 
changes at many levels, but one particular valuable approach is through 
programmes of 'community education' ranging from the school to adult education. 
As the 1975 Report on Community Relations (Lippman Committee Report)29 states 
that: · 
the main thrust of the community relations program should be towards the Australian 
community and generally effected through the schools. colleges and universities, continuing 
education programs for adults, in the workshops and on the factory floor, and through the 
intelligent use of the media including broadcasting, the press and public advertisements. The 
battle to be fought and won is against prejudice and ethnocentricity and for the adoption of 
tolerant attitudes towards the miscellanea of ethnic communities which are not an integral 
part of Australian society. 
As a rule these community education strategies are surprisingly absent in the 
Australian scene. Admittedly this strategy provides no panacea but needs to be 
pursued along with other strategies; and it has to be located within a truly ·. 
educational context. At all times the object of the exercise must be to endeavour to 
change attitudes and behaviour of all groups in the community. 
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I concur with Peter RosenthaP0 that: 
.. .in the short run, however. criminal laws against racist propaganda and racial harassment 
may be the only effective means of protecting members of minority groups from the most 
visible forms of racial abuse. Moreover, criminalising such expressions of racism may 
contribute to teaching that racism is immoral. 
Furthermore, according to Rosenthal 
Notes 
The concerns of certain civil libertarians for an abstract notion of free speech' do not 
provide sufficient justification for maintaining a 'right' of racists to harass members of 
minority groups'. 
1. Revised text of an address given to the Law School, University of WA, 
Perth, in May 1992. 
2. L. Jayasuriya, 'Racism and Immigration in Australia: from Old to New'. In 
Human Biology: An Integrative Science. ed. P. O'Higgins, Centre of 
Human Biology, University ofWA, Perth. 
3. SeeR. Miles (1989), Racism. Routledge. 
4. SeeR. Miles (1982), Racism and Migrant Labour. Routledge. 
5. M. Radis (1988), 'Legislative Treatment of Vulgar Racism'. Migration 
Monitor, July. 
6. Melinda Jones (1993) 'Using the Law to Combat Hate Speech', Without 
Prejudice, No 7, Aprill994, pp 14-20. 
7. See several HRC (1982-84) Occasional Papers 1-3, and 7; and also the NSW 
document: 'Preventing Racial Conflict, published for the Anti 
Discrimination Board, by the Dept of Adult Education, University of Sydney 
in 1982. More recently, the HREOC (1991) 'Report OD Racist Violence' 
has examined this issue and the current status is reviewed fully in Chapters 2 
&11. 
8. See Australian Journal of Social Issues. 1984 Vol 19 (4). 
9. See e.g. page 11 of the WA Equal Opportunity Commission Report (1984) 
submitted to the W A Government for an account of the explanation given by 
the Australian government justifying its reservation to this Article. 
10. Ibid. HRC (1981-84) Occasional Papers 1-3. 
17 
11. See Paul Stein's 'Introduction' in 'Preventing Racial Conflict', p. 8. op cit. 
p. 7. 
12. Extract from HRC Report No. 7 (1993): Proposal for Amendmems to 
Racial Discriminahon Act to Cover Incitement to Racial Hatred and Racial 
defamaation. 
13. See J. Mathews (1988) 'Protection of Minorities and Equal Opportunities', 
in UNSW Law Journal Vol II, pp 1-3; and M. Wilkie (1994) 
'Multiculturalism and Anti discrimination law in Australia', New Community 
Vol20 (3), pp. 437-53. Both provide good overviews of equal opportunity 
and discrimination legislation in Australia. This legislation has been greatly 
influenced by the RD Act of 1975 and often the State legislation overlaps 
with the Federallegislartion dealing with racism. 
14. See 'Preventing Racial Conflict', op cit. p. 7. 
15. See HEROC Report (1991) on 'Racist Violence', Chapter 11 (pp 286-288), 
for a detailed description of the NSW legislation. 
16. Ibid pl4. 
17. Ibid p 14. 
18. The HRC Report of 1982 Occasional Paper No.2 provides a comparison of 
the legislative enactments on racial harassment and incitement to racial 
hatred. This Table shows the main points of similarity and difference on 
seven criteria, viz consistencv, provisions of Act, nature of the Act, 
defences permitted and the sanctions provided. Recent Australian legislation 
v.-arrants comparison on these criteria. 
19. See HREOC Report 1991 on 'Racist Violence', Appendix 4 for a brief 
comparative description of the nature and scope of anti-discrimination 
legislation in 4 States. 
20. Speech by Michael Duffl in the Australian Parliament iD the Second 
Reading of Introducing the Racial Discrimination Amendment Bill1992. 
21. See A. Matheson's Annual review, for the ACTU, entitled: Racism in 
Australia: More or Less? 1989, 90-92, for the incidence of racism; and also 
the documentation provided by HREOC (1991) 'Report on Racist Violence. 
22. Op cit. p.7. 
23. See Duffy. op cit. p. 19. 
18 
24. See Yves de Montigny (1992). 'The Difficult Relationship benveen Freedom 
and Expression and its Reasonable Limits', Law and Contemporary 
Problems Vol 55 (1), pp. 35-52. 
25. Op cit. p.7. 
26. Alan Goldberg (1990). 'Criminal or Civil Sanctions? Legislating Against 
Racial Vilification'. WithoutPrejudice No 1. 
27. See in particular Section VI ofL. Jayasuriya (1989 'Legislation Against 
Raciallncitement: Strategies and Rationales'. Occasional Paper No. 5, 
Dept of Social Work and Social Administration, University offW A, Perth. 
28. P. Rosenthal, 'The Criminality of Racial Harassment'. Canadian Human 
Rights Year Book (1989-90). 
29. Dept oflmmigration (1975): Report of the Committee on Community 
Relations. (Chair. Walter Lippman) AGPS Canberra. 
30. Op cit. p.27. 
19 
